

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01762 01 OF 03 011556Z

47

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 057955

R 011428Z APR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 919

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

TUSNAAA/USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 1762

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: WORKING GROUP DRAFT REPORT ON DATA REQUIRING AGREEMENT
WITH THE EAST

REF: USNATO 808 DTG 131802Z FEB 75

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE MBFR
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON MBFR DATA REQUIRING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST.
THIS DRAFT IS IN RESPONSE TO THE SPC MANDATE (REFTEL), FOLLOWING
DISCUSSION OF THE DUTCH PROPOSAL ON DATA. THIS DRAFT REPORT
RECOGNIZES
ALLIED TACTICAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PRESSING THE EAST
FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA, THE REPORT CONCERNS ITSELF ONLY WITH
MILITARY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS ON DATA EXCHANGE.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: THIS DRAFT REPORT IS ON WG AGENDA FOR MEETING
ON TUESDAY, APRIL 8. REQUEST GUIDANCE.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01762 01 OF 03 011556Z

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT REPORT BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP

1. AT THEIR MEETING ON 13 FEBRUARY, 1975, AFTER DISCUSSING A PROPOSAL BY THE NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE INVITED THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO DETERMINE WHAT DATA, IF ANY, IS ESSENTIAL TO BE AGREED UPON WITH THE OTHER SIDE IN RELATION TO THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION(1).

2. THIS PAPER EXAMINES ONLY THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ISSUE. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP RECOGNISES THAT THE DEMAND FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA COULD BE A STRONG ELEMENT OF THE ALLIED TACTICAL NEGOTIATING POSITION IN VIENNA; AND THAT THERE MAY BE A POLITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH EXCHANGES. IN THAT CONTEXT, IT IS NOTED THAT, WITHIN THE CURRENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION, THE ALLIES ARE ENVISAGING THE EXCHANGE OF GROSS MANPOWER FIGURES GIVING:

- A. TOTALS FOR ALLIED AND WP GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE NGA.
- B. TOTALS FOR US AND USSR GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA.
- C. IF NECESSARY, TOTALS FOR SOME ALLIED AND WP FORCE ELEMENTS WHICH ARE DIFFERENTLY ALLOCATED BY THE TWO SIDES TO GROUND AND AIR FORCES (E.G. AREA AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL).

3. THE DATA THAT COULD BE AGREED WITH RESPECT TO EITHER PHASE I OF PHASE II FALL INTO ONE OF THREE CATEGORIES:

- A. INITIAL LEVELS OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED:
- B. ACTUAL (PROPOSED) REDUCTIONS; AND
- C. RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THESE CATEGORIES OF DATA MUST BE AGREED IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT PHASE I AND II OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION IS DISCUSSED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

(1) AC/119-R(75)17

PHASE I

4. THE ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR PHASE I SPECIFIES THE SCALE AND SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01762 01 OF 03 011556Z

FORM OF REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH THE US AND USSR(1). THE ONLY DOUBTFUL FIGURE WITH RESPECT TO THE INITIAL FORCE LEVELS OF THESE COUNTRIES IS THAT FOR SOVIET TOTAL GROUND MANPOWER IN THE NGA (460,000), WHICH, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO AGREED NATO INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AS TO THE MARGIN OF ERROR IN NATO ESTIMATES, COULD BE SUBJECT TO ERROR BY AS MUCH AS 10PERCENT. WHILE THE SOVIETS COULD CHALLENGE THE NATO FIGURE, IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY FOR EACH SIDE TO AGREE TO THE INITIAL LEVELS INVOLVED BECAUSE THE ACCURACY OF THESE FIGURES IS NOT GERMANE TO THE ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PHASE I PROPOSAL, ONLY THE LEVELS OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED ARE IMPORTANT. FOR THE SAME REASON AND BECAUSE ONLY US AND USSR FORCES ARE INVOLVED IN PHASE I, THERE WOULD BE NO REQUIREMENT TO AGREE ON INITIAL LEVELS OF NATO AND WP FORCES IN THE NGA.

5. THE ONLY DOUBTFUL FIGURE WITH RESPECT TO THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED IS THAT OF THE MANPOWER OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY (ABOUT 68,000). THE SOVIETS COULD DISPUTE THE WESTERN CLAIM THAT THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS 15PERCENT OF SOVIET MANPOWER IN THE NGA AND CLAIM IT TO BE A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TOTAL FORCES, SEEKING TO OBTAIN HIGHER US REDUCTIONS AND LOWER USSR REDUCTIONS. TO SUBSTANTIATE THAT CLAIM, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE THEIR OWN FIGURES FOR THE TANK ARMY. EVEN THEN, FROM THE PRACTICAL AND MILITARY VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY TO AGREE TO THE MANPOWER FIGURE, PROVIDED THE EAST AGREED TO WITHDRAW A SOVIET TANK ARMY OF 5 DIVISIONS. WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET UNITS (AS WELL AS THE 1,700 TANKS) COULD BE VERIFIED;

(1) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 SOLDIERS COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED. MILITARILY, THE IMPORTANT ISSUE IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITS AND TANKS BECAUSE THEY, RATHER THAN THE PERSONNEL, CONSTITUTE THE REAL THREAT TO NATO.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01762 02 OF 03 011609Z

47

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 058109

R 011428Z APR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 920

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

TUSNAAA/USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 1762

6. PHASE I RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS CONSTITUTE THE BASE FOR ANY NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT BETWEEN THE PHASES AND THE BASE, IF FORCES ARE NEITHER INCREASED NOR DECREASED BETWEEN THE PHASES, AGAINST WHICH PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BE APPLIED. THERE WOULD

BE LITTLE POINT OR ADVANTAGE IN ATTEMPTING TO AGREE THESE LEVELS. EACH SIDE CAN CALCULATE THESE LEVELS, WHETHER IN MANPOWER OR UNITS, BY SUBTRACTING ACTUAL REDUCTIONS FROM INITIAL FORCE LEVELS. SINCE EACH SIDE IS LIKELY TO PLACE MORE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ESTIMATE OF INITIAL FORCE LEVELS THAN IN AGREED INITIAL FORCE LEVELS, EACH SIDE IS LIKELY TO HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR CALCULATION OF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS, ADJUSTED AS NECESSARY BY ANY AGREEMENT ON REDEFINITION OF FORCES, THAN ON DATA SUGGESTED BY THE OTHER SIDE TO BE AGREED. FURTHER, ANY AGREEMENT ON RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS (POST PHASE I) STATED IN MANPOWER ALONE WOULD NOT BE VERIFI-
ABLE: AND IF STATED IN UNITS COULD PUT A DE FACTO CEILING ON UNITS PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON PHASE II.

PHASE II
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01762 02 OF 03 011609Z

7. AS STATED IN PARA 6, PHASE I RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS CONSTITUTE THE BASE AGAINST WHICH PHASE II REDUCTIONS WULD BE APPLIED. PHASE I RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS, ADJUSTED BY ACTUAL OR ESTIMATED INCREASES OR DECREASES AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ANY REDEFINITION OF FORCES, BECOME THE INITIAL FORCE LEVELS TO BE REDUCED IN PHASE II. SINCE THESE LEVELS CAN BE CALCULATED, THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO AGREE TO THEM.

8. MILITARILY THE IMPORTANCE OF ANY AGREEMENT LIES IN RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS IN CONFRONTATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THESE BE SUCH AS TO ENSURE STABILITY. MOREOVER THERE SHOULD BE A BASIS FROM WHICH ANY SUSPECTED VIOLATION OF THESE FORCE LEVELS COULD BE CHALLENGED. WHETHER DATA WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD DEPEND ON THE APPROACH TAEN TO ESTABLISH THESE RESIDUAL LEVELS. THE RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS COULD BE ESTABLISHED EITHER BY CALCULATION, THAT IS SUBTRACTING ESTALISHED PHASE II REDUCTION LEVELS FROM PHASE II INITIAL FORCE LEVELS, OR BY AGREEMENT.

9. IF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS WERE TO BE DETERMINED BY CALCULATION THE FOLLOWING APPLY;

A. IF THE PHASE II AGREEMENT CALLED FOR A REDUCTION IN MANPOWER TO AN EXACT COMMON CEILING FIGURE, EACH SIDE COULD CALCULATE THE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS REQUIRED BY SUBTRACTING THE AGREED COMMON CEILING FIGURE FROM THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE INITIAL FORCE LEVELS TO BE REDUCED IN PHASE II. HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT REDUCTION FIGURES CALCULATED BY THE WEST WOULD AGREE WITH THAT CALCULATED BY THE EAST. FOR THIS REASON, EACH SIDE WOULD WANT THE OTHER TO DECLARE ITS REDUCTION FIGURE IN ORDER TO ASSESS WHETHER THE OTHER SIDE WAS FULFILLING THE TERMS OF THE REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER TO APPROXIMATE PARITY AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING FIGURE, ONLY APPROXIMATIONS OF THE REQUIRED REDUCTIONS COLD BE CALCULATED, MAKING IT EVEN MORE IMPERATIVE THAT EACH SIDE DECLARE AND AGREE THE NUMBER OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN. EVEN THOUGH THE REDUCTION MANPOWER FIGURES WERE AGREED, THE RESULTANT RESIDUAL MANPOWER FIGURE, CALCULATED UNDER THIS APPROACH BY SUBTRACTING THE

AGREED REDUCTION FIGURE FROM THE INITIAL PHSE I FORCE LEVEL, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME MARGIN OF ERROR AS IN THE ESTIMATES OF THE INITIAL PHASE II FORCE LEVELS. WESTERN CALCULATIONS OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS IN THIS MANNER WOULD PROBABLY NOT AGREE

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01762 02 OF 03 011609Z

WITH EASTERN CALCULATIONS AND BOTH SIDES WOULD WANT THE OTHER TO DECLARE AND AGREE THE RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS, AS THEY WOULD IN THE CASE OF PHASE II MANPOWER REDUCTION LEVELS. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE MORE EXPEDIENT FROM THE OUTSET TO AGREE TO RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS THAN TO AGREE REDUCTION MANPOWER LEVELS FIRST AND THEN RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS.

B. IF THE AGREEMENT CALLED FOR REDUCTIONS IN UNITS TO APPROXIMATE PARITY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR EACH SIDE TO DECLARE THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN/DISBANDED IN ORDER TO CALCULATE, IN TERMS OF UNITS, RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS. IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY FOR EITHER SIDE TO PROVIDE THE UNIT DESIGNATION (NAME) OF THE UNITS TO BE REDUCED OR THEIR MANPOWER STRENGTHS, ALTHOUGH KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH UNIT DESIGNATION WOULD PROBABLY DECREASE THE TIME TO VERIFY THEIR WITHDRAWAL/DISBANDMENT. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES COULD PROVIDE A MANPOWER FIGURE FOR EACH TYPE UNIT TO BE WITHDRAWN, BUT FROM A MILITARY VIEWPOINT IT WOULD BE IRRELEVANT WHETHER ALLIED MANPOWER ASSESSMENTS FOR THESE UNITS WERE RIGHT OR NOT, PROVIDED THE UNITS WERE WITHDRAWN. NATO CONFIDENCE, AND PROBABLY THAT OF THE WP, IN THE LEVEL OF RESIDUAL FORCES CALCULATED BY CONSIDERING UNIT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE GREATER THAN IN THE LEVEL CALCULATED BY CONSIDERING MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. EVEN SO, LIKE CALCULATIONS BASED ON MANPOWER, EAST AND WEST CALCULATIONS OF RESIDUAL FORCES IN TERMS OF UNITS ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE. NEVERTHELESS, UNLIDE CALCULATIONS BASED ON MANPOWER, BOTH SIDES WOULD OBJECT, ON SECURITY GROUNDS, TO ANY EXCHANGE OR DECLARATION OF DATA ON UNITS OF RESIDUAL FORCES, IN THAT IT COULD ASSIST EACH SIDE IN ASSESSING THE OTHER'S COMBAT CAPABILITIES AND READINESS, AND IN ASSESSING PRIORITIES FOR TARGETS. THERE WOULD ALSO BE A DANGER TO SECURITY IF THE ALLIES, IN PRESSING FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA, WERE TO REVEAL DETAIL OF ALLIED INTELLIGENCE ON WP FORCES WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE THE SOURCE OF SUCH INTELLIGENCE. FOR THIS REASON, RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS IN UNITS MUST BE CALCULATED BY SUBTRACTING AGREED REDUCTION LEVELS IN UNITS FROM ESTIMATES OF INITIAL PHASE II FORCE LEVELS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01762 03 OF 03 011626Z

47

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 058343

R 011428Z APR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 921

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

TUSNAAA/USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 1762

10. THERE WOULD BE NO REQUIREMENT, OF COURSE, TO AGREE PHASE II REDUCTION MANPOWER OR UNIT LEVELS, IF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS WERE AGREED FIRST. AS INDICATED IN PARA 9, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE EXPEDIENT AND POSSIBLE TO AGREE RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS IN TERMS OF MANPOWER, AGREEMENT ON RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS EXPRESSED IN UNITS, AT LEAST IN ANY DETAIL, WOULD BE OBJECTIONABLE FROM THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT ON SECURITY GROUNDS.
OTHER CONSIDERATION

11. NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR MANPOWER. THE ALLIES HAVE OFFERED, IN VIENNA, TO CONCLUDE A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR AIR MANPOWER BETWEEN MBFR PHASES. SUCH A COMMITMENT COULD BE A SIMPLE JOINT DECLARATION THAT THE "PRESENT LEVELS" WOULD NOT BE INCREASED AND WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE AGREEMENT ON WHAT THOSE LEVELS MIGHT BE. VERIFICATION OF ADHERENCE TO THE COMMITMENT COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED WHETHER THE LEVELS WERE SPECIFIED OR NOT.

12. EXCEPTIONS FOR EXERCISES, TRAINING AND ROTATIONS.
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01762 03 OF 03 011626Z

IT WOULD BE NECESSARY, AT THE APPROPRIATE POINT IN NEGOTIATIONS, TO AGREE WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON REGULATING TEMPORARY FLUCTUATIONS FROM POST-MBFR FORCE LEVELS, IN EITHER PHASE, REQUIRED FOR EXERCISES, TRAINING AND ROTATIONS. THE LEVEL OF SUCH FLUCTUATIONS WOULD PROBABLY NEED TO BE SPECIFIED BUT IT MIGHT BE THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD BE "NOT TO EXCEED PRESENT NORMS".

13. REDEFINITION OF FORCES. THE ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL SPECIFIES BOTH THE FORM AND SCALE OF REDUCTIONS; NO ANOMALOUS FORCES ARE INVOLVED. THUS, A REDEFINITION OF FORCES WOULD NOT NECESSITATE AN EXCHANGE OF DATA FOR PHASE I. FOR PHASE II, AS A RESULT OF REDEFINITION, ANOMALOUS FORCES COULD BE INCLUDED IN FORCES TO BE REDUCED, INCLUDED IN RESIDUAL FORCES, OR EXCLUDED BOTH FROM THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED AND RESIDUAL FORCES. SUCH

REDEFINITION, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT NECESSARILY NECESSITATE AN EXCHANGE OF DATA AS A REQUISITE FOR PHASE II. ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT MANPOWER, INSTEAD OF UNITS, WERE THE BASIS FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS, WOULD ACCURATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MANPOWER FIGURE, INCLUDING THOSE OF ANOMALOUS FORCES, BE ESSENTIAL IN EXPRESSING RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS. ANOMALOUS FORCES, NOT A PART OF RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES, WOULD BE COUNTED, DEPENDING UPON THE PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT, EITHER AS A PART OF THE AIR FORCES OR AS AN ENTITY SEPARATE FROM GROUND OR AIR FORCES. WERE A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT OR NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDED THESE ANOMALOUS FORCES EXPRESSED IN MANPOWER FIGURES, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KNOW THEIR STRENGTH.

FINDINGS

14. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT A DEMAND FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA COULD BE A STRONG ELEMENT OF THE ALLIED TACTICAL NEGOTIATING POSITION AND THAT THERE MAY BE A POLITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH EXCHANGES, FIND THAT FROM A MILITARY/TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT:

A. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO EXCHANGE OR AGREE DATA ON PHASE I.

IF MANPOWER ALONE WERE TO BE THE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II LEADING TO AN AGREED COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE, ACCURATE KNOWLEDGE OF MANPOWER FIGURES WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IN EXPRESSING RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS: NEITHER PHASE II INITIAL MANPOWER LEVELS NOR MANPOWER REDUCTION LEVELS WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED. HOWEVER, AN APPROACH BASED ON MANPOWER WOULD ENTAIL AN AGREEMENT WHERE VER-

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01762 03 OF 03 011626Z

IFICATION COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED AND WOULD THUS CONTRAVENE AN ALLIED REQUIREMENT THAT ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION(1).

C. IF UNITS WERE TO BE THE BASIS OF REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO AGREE TO REDUCTION LEVELS. AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON RESIDUAL FORCE UNITS WOULD BE UNWISE, ENTAILING SECURITY RISKS WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD FIND OBJECTIONABLE: AGREEMENT ON INITIAL PHASE II LEVEL OF FORCES WOULD BE UNNECESSARY. RESIDUAL FORCES AND WITHDRAWAL/DISBANDMENT OF AGREED REDUCTION FORCES WOULD BE VERIFIABLE.

(1) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

----- END TEXT PEREZ

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO001762
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197504101/abbrzjbq.tel
Line Count: 371
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 808 DTG 131802Z FEB 75
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <07 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: WORKING GROUP DRAFT REPORT ON DATA REQUIRING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
TUSNAAA USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006